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THE SHADOW ECONOMY AND MORALS: A NOTE 
by 
EKKEHART SCHLICHT 
Darmstadt I n s t i t u t e of Technology 
ABSTRACT: If the established r u l e s are obeyed spontaneously i n an econ-
omy, t h i s increases economic e f f i c i e n c y since the u n c e r t a i n t i e s , moni-
torin g costs and incentive problems induced by opportunism can be avoid-
ed. Opportunism w i l l be increased by increasing the incentives f o r un-
lawful behaviour, however, and a s l i g h t increase i n these i n c e n t i v e s 
might cause a cumulative and s e l f - n o u r i s h i n g breakdown of morals. The 
dangers of the growing shadow economy are louring here. 
1. Transaction Costs, Morals, and Economic E f f i c i e n c y 
Modern economics has assimilated Coases (1937) fundamental i n s i g h t 
that transaction costs are paramount for understanding the formation 
and functioning of economic i n s t i t u t i o n s (Williamson, 1975). 
Transaction costs, however, are heavily influenced by morals: If 
people observe the rules spontaneously, t h i s saves c o n t r o l costs and 
increases economic e f f i c i e n c y thereby. Hence working morals, tax morals, 
business morals, and the spontaneous observation of property r i g h t s 
are important fa c t o r s of economic e f f i c i e n c y . Think on how our economy 
would look l i k e i f everybody behaved absolutely o p p o r t u n i s t i c a l l y : 
Half of the population at l e a s t would be employed as policemen, and 
they would be corrupt"^: Transaction costs might well become p r o h i b i -
t i v e l y large, rendering the market system, as compared to other systems 
of economic co-ordination, hopelessly i n e f f i c i e n t . These considerations 
lead me, as an economist who i s concerned with economic e f f i c i e n c y , 
to worry about morals and to present some thoughts on the impact of 
the emerging shadow economy on morals. 
I would l i k e to thank an anonymous referee for h e l p f u l h i n t s . 
See also S c h l i c h t (1983), section 1.1. Note, by the way, that markets 
clo s e s t to perfect competition, l i k e the stockmarket, are h e a v i l y 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d (I owe t h i s observation to R. Coase) and that 
the proper functioning of other markets hinges c r i t i c a l l y upon the 
observation of c e r t a i n conventions, see Akerlof (1976). 
2. Moral E x t e r n a l i t i e s 
Exceptions undermine p r i n c i p l e s , and rules get enfeebled i f i t becomes 
customary to disobey them according to circumstances. The great dangers 
associated with the emerging shadow economy seems to me to be of t h i s 
kind. Since the growth of the shadow economy renders the v i o l a t i o n 
of laws customary, t h i s weakens the binding force of laws, i n general: 
In t h i s sense, we ought to expect moral e x t e r n a l i t i e s leading i n e v i -
t a b l y to the necessity of enforcing the observation of laws i n general 
more c l o s e l y . This leads to increasing cost of p o l i c i n g which are sunk. 
In a wider p o l i t i c a l sense, there are a d d i t i o n a l s o c i a l costs 
associated with such a t r a n s i t i o n : An increasing degree of s u r v e i l l a n c e 
r e s t r i c t s freedom, changes the p o l i t i c a l climate and induces consid-
erable psychic costs f o r the population at large. In a d d i t i o n s o c i a l 
psychology p r e d i c t s that an increasing degree of c o n t r o l w i l l undermine 
the i n t r i n s i c motivation to law-obedience s t i l l f u r t h e r , e s t a b l i s h i n g 
another one-way road to serfdom. 
In a more r e s t r i c t e d economic sense the erosion of law obedience 
w i l l induce a s h i f t of the tax burden away from a c t i v i t i e s which are 
d i f f i c u l t to monitor, and towards more e a s i l y c o n t r o l l a b l e a c t i v i t i e s . 
The associated a l l o c a t i v e d i s t o r t i o n s increase dead-weight losses. 
Although one could argue that a decreasing degree of law-obedience 
decreases the power of the state, I think i t i s a doubtful argument 
to maintain that t h i s w i l l decrease the scale of government a c t i v i t i e s 
and thereby decrease dead-weight losses. But even i f t h i s holds true, 
i t might be at most a t h i r d best s o l u t i o n having to put up with the 
a d d i t i o n a l costs of s u r v e i l l a n c e and d i s t o r t i o n s . 
3. A Model of the Breakdown of Morals 
In economics we are accustomed to think i n terms of marginal changes. 
Hence we might be led to think that s l i g h t l y i n creasing incentives 
to unlawful behaviour w i l l only lead to a s l i g h t l y l e s s e r degree of 
law-obedience. 
I would l i k e to argue that t h i s i s not n e c e s s a r i l y the case and 
that, at a c e r t a i n point, a cumulative and s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g breakdown 
of morals might be i n i t i a t e d by a small increase i n incentives to behave 
un-lawfully. 
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Consider a c e r t a i n l e g a l or customary rule l i k e making a correct tax 
return, and assume that the degree of observation of t h i s rule can 
be measured by a number a^etO, 1] where a^ = 1 denotes s t r i c t obedience 
and a^ = 0 denotes non-obedience, and the subscript i r e f e r s to the 
number of the p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l chosen. 
We assume the i n d i v i d u a l to s e l e c t i t s a^ optimally such as to 
maximize net gains which are c a l c u l a t e d by taking into account psychic 
as well as non-psychic advantages and disadvantages. 
Denote the average degree of law-obedience i n the economy as a 
whole by a. Reference group theory suggests that the psychic costs 
of disobedience r i s e with increasing a"** ^  : People t r y not to deviate 
from established r u l e s . Hence we ought to expect a^ to be an i n c r e a s i n g 
function of a. 
(In a d d i t i o n , there might be d i r e c t advantages f o r reference group 
behaviour: Think about the observation of t r a f f i c l i g h t s . If i t i s 
custom not to observe them, the other d r i v e r s w i l l be on t h e i r guard, 
and the p o t e n t i a l damage due to disregarding the l i g h t s w i l l be smaller 
than otherwise.) 
Furthermore we might assume that the degree of obedience a^ i s 
affe c t e d by an e x t e r n a l l y f i x e d economic incentive e, embodied, f o r 
instance, i n a tax law, which establishes an a d d i t i o n a l advantage f o r 
2 ) 
non-obedience. Hence we are led to write: 
(1) a i = f 1 ( a , e ) a ± , a e(0, 1) 
> 0, < 0 
C a l c u l a t i n g the average over i n d i v i d u l a s leads to a new average degree 
of law obedience 
(2) â = f (a,e) â , a eCO, 1) 
f l > °' f2 < 0 
It i s assumed that some spontaneous (or random) instances of law obe-
dience occur even for a = 0, and some disobedience occurs even f o r 
a = 1, amounting to 
(3) f ( 0 , e) > 0, f ( l , e) < 1 
Consider now the change of an over time. 
See S c h l i c h t (1983) for some underlying theory and references. 
2 ) The following analysis i s a modification of the theory developed 
i n S c h l i c h t (1981). 
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A n a t u r a l s p e c i f i c a t i o n i s 
(4) â = u(f(a, e) - a) y > 0 
f o r some speed of adjustment p.Under the assumption (3) (and given con-
tinuous d i f f e r e n t i a b i l i t y of f) there e x i s t s at l e a s t one stable degree 
of law-obedience a s a t i s f y i n g 
(5) f ( a e) f x ( a e) < 1 
It need not be unique, however. On the contrary: A possible shape of 
f i s as depicted i n Figure 1: 
This type of shape w i l l r e s u l t i f the incentives f o r reference group 
behaviour are strong and people tend to behave as the majority does. 
Since, according to (4), a r i s e s i f f ( a , e) > a, and a declines 
* * 
i f f ( a , e) < a, two stable states of law-obedience a r i s e : a^ and a 2-
Assume that i n i t i a l l y a high degree of morality p r e v a i l s : We have 
a = a 0 . Assume now that the external incentive for transgressing the 
law i s increased. This w i l l s h i f t the f-curve downward. Hence a 2 w i l l 
be reduced. This can continue u n t i l the p o s i t i o n depicted i n Figure 2 
i s reached. 
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1 -
< < 1 
Figure 2» 
An unstable s i t u a t i o n i s reached, and a s l i g h t increase i n the economic 
in c e n t i v e e w i l l r e s u l t i n a c o l l a p s e : a 2 w i l l disappear and the s i n g l e 
stable degree of law-obedience w i l l be the low one. At t h i s point, 
a s l i g h t increase of the economic incentive w i l l decrease the degree 
of law-obedience a l i t t l e ( f 2 • d e ) . This reduces the average degree 
of law-obedience. Through reference group behaviour, t h i s reduces law-
obedience s t i l l f u r t h e r , and a cumulative and s e l f - n o u r i s h i n g break-
* 
down of law-obedience r e s u l t s , u n t i l the low eq u i l i b r i u m a, i s reached. 
S t a r t i n g from low law-obedience at a,, i t i s rather d i f f i c u l t 
* ^ 
to reach the high e q u i l i b r i u m i n a^ (Figure 1). Hence the e s t a b l i s h -
ment of adequate morals, as long as t h e i r observation i s strongly de-
termined by reference group behaviour, might prove to be d i f f i c u l t 
and c o s t l y . In t h i s sense, the breakdown of morals caused by s l i g h t 
economic incentives might be a c o s t l y a f f a i r . 
4. What Can be Done? 
The growth of the shadow economy seems to be at l e a s t p a r t i a l l y caused 
by economic i n c e n t i v e s . The growth of the shadow economy, however, 
weakens the observation of l e g a l r u l e s everywhere. This induces moral 
e x t e r n a l i t i e s : e f f i c i e n c y losses within the l e g a l sector of the economy. 
As i l l u s t r a t e d i n the l a s t s e c t i o n , t h i s might lead, at worst, to a 
coll a p s e of morals. 
To suppress t h i s development by power of p o l i c e might be counter-
productive since i t undermines the i n t r i n s i c motivation to observe 
the l a w 1 ) . 
1) See above, se c t i o n 2. 
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The other a l t e r n a t i v e i s , of course, to reduce the gains from unlawful 
behaviour: Individuals ought to decide on t h e i r s o c i a l insurance con-
t r i b u t i o n s independently of t h e i r reported income, f o r instance. 
To prevent massive moral e x t e r n a l i t i e s i t seems to be advisable, 
furthermore to l e g a l i z e those shadow a c t i v i t i e s which cannot be con-
t r o l l e d anyhow and which are accepted as legitimate i n s o c i e t y . By 
e r e c t i n g a fence i n a contested t e r r i t o r y one might hope to reduce 
f i g h t s whereas a fence somewhere i n the middle of the v i l l a g e of one 
of the p a r t i e s w i l l simply increase transaction costs, and w i l l appear 
as being rather u n f a i r . 
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